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We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics - earning 
ability  and  leisure  needs  -  assumed  to  be  imperfectly  correlated.  Individuals  have  private 
information about their abilities but needs are observable. With two different levels of observable 
needs the population can be separated into two groups and needs may be used as a tag. We first 
assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs 
and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with 
tagging.  We  also  consider  an  alternative  social  objective  in  which  individuals  are  deemed 
responsible for their needs. 
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In the standard optimal redistributive taxation framework individuals are assumed to diﬀer in
some private characteristic, often ability, whose distribution is commonly known. The private
information nature of this characteristic imposes limits on the amount of redistribution that can
be achieved. In particular, the redistributive policy must be designed so that individuals are
given proper incentives to reveal their true types. The ﬁrst paper to emphasize the implications
of informational asymmetries on the design of optimal taxes was Mirrlees (1971). He did so
by assuming a continuum of abilities. Stiglitz (1982) considered a discrete number of ability
types instead and was able to provide further insights on the role of the incentive compatibility
constraints.
Individuals may diﬀer in more than one characteristic. Some authors have explored the
implications of using available information about additional individual characteristics. In a
seminal paper in this area, Akerlof (1978) argued that such characteristics have a role to play
in the design of optimal tax schemes if they are correlated with ability, and this even when the
characteristics are not, in themselves, pertinent for redistribution. He considered a model in
which high- and low-ability individuals could be grouped into two categories on the basis of an
exogenously observable characteristic. One category consisted of low-ability types only and the
other of both low- and high-ability types. He showed that, within his setting, "tagging" (i.e.
conditioning the tax on the observable individual characteristic) increases social welfare. With
a utilitarian social welfare function the two low-ability types end up, however, with diﬀerent
utility levels, with the person in the group consisting only of low-ability types enjoying a higher
utility. More generally, tagging can be employed to reduce the cost of redistribution but might
violate the principle of horizontal equity.
Other papers have extended this analysis. The literature has produced, however, very few
clear-cut results on the implications of tagging on the properties of optimal non-linear income
tax schedules. Immonen et al. (1998) studied the pattern of optimal marginal income tax rates
in a model with continuous abilities and two tagged groups. Their analysis relied however on
simulations and they did not provide analytical results. More recently, Cremer et al. (2009)
have been able to derive analytical results in a model with a continuum of individuals that can
be divided into two groups with diﬀerent ability distributions over the same support. They
do so assuming quasilinear preferences, a Rawlsian social welfare function, and a constant and
1identical elasticity of labour supply within and across the tagged groups, where tagging is based
on a publicly and costlessly observable exogenous characteristic. Under these assumptions they
show that the marginal income tax rates in the two tagged groups bracket the marginal tax
rate obtained when all individuals are pooled together, at all skill levels. In addition, they show
that if the skills distribution in one group ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the other, tagging
calls for redistribution from the former to the latter group. They also provide solutions for
income, consumption, and utility, for all individual types, with and without tagging. Finally,
they perform some simulations to illustrate tagging on the basis of age. As it was pointed out
above, tagging is often considered objectionable because it violates the principle of horizontal
equity. They claim however that, from a lifetime perspective, tagging on the basis of age
escapes this common objection. Optimal age-dependent taxation had been previously studied
by Lozachmeur (2006) and Blomquist and Micheletto (2008).
The characteristics considered by Cremer et al. (2009) are, as in Akerlof (1978), exempt
from welfare signiﬁcance. They are only incorporated in the design of the optimal tax scheme
in order to relax the constraints imposed on redistribution by the inability of the planner to ob-
serve those characteristics that are considered pertinent for redistribution, in particular ability.
Boadway and Pestieau (2006) study the eﬀects of tagging on redistributive taxation both when
the observable characteristic does not have any normative value in itself (denominated hence-
forth "pure tagging") and when it does have welfare signiﬁcance. In particular, they assume
that households vary by needs, where diﬀerences in needs represent diﬀerences in the amount
of resources required to achieve a given level of utility. Following Rowe and Woolley (1999)
and Boadway and Pestieau (2003b), they consider the case in which needs reﬂect diﬀerences in
consumption requirements. They compare the solutions obtained with pure tagging and tagging
with consumption needs. They also analyze the extent of compensation for needs when tagging
is not feasible due, for instance, to political constraints or ethical concerns with the violation of
horizontal equity. In order to be able to provide qualitative results they assume quasilinear pref-
erences and social welfare functions that exhibit constant absolute aversion to inequality, instead
of the more common constant relative aversion. They provide analytical results for the particu-
lar maximin social objective, but also for more general objectives characterized by positive but
ﬁnite constant absolute aversion to inequality. When the tag does not have welfare signiﬁcance
they show that, under reasonable circumstances, the tax system is more redistributive in the
2tagged group with the higher proportion of high-ability persons and that inter-group redistri-
bution always goes from the group with higher proportion of high-ability types to that with a
lower proportion. When individuals diﬀer in consumption needs and these can be observed, full
compensation for needs is optimal if a separate tax schedule applies to the two groups. The
compensation for needs is indeed a component of the optimal inter-group lump-sum redistrib-
ution scheme and, within each group, the optimal tax schedule depends on the distribution of
ability types in the group. When observable consumption needs cannot be used as a tag and
individuals face a common tax schedule, there is generally imperfect compensation for needs:
both under- and over-compensation can result depending on the correlation of needs with ability.
Rowe and Woolley (1999) had previously suggested giving universal credit for expenditures on
consumption needs as part of an optimal non-linear income tax system.
In a related paper, Boadway and Pestieau (2003a) distinguish two types of needs - consump-
tion and leisure needs. Leisure needs may stem for instance from some type of disability or health
condition that the individual has to account for before she can become an active participant in
the labor market. They discuss the implications for the optimal tax problem of the diﬀerent
types of needs being observable or not. They provide, but do not explore in detail, a few results
on tagging. With observable leisure needs, the maximin optimum would be characterized by a
standard non-linear income tax schedule with the usual characteristics (i.e. non-distortion at
the top and distortion at the bottom) within each group, and a transfer from the low-needs to
the high-needs group. The correlation between ability and needs would play a crucial role. If,
for example, the more able individuals have low needs, the transfer across needs groups would
be large and would consist of two parts: one accounting for diﬀerences in needs and one for
diﬀerences in average productivity.
In this paper we analyze tagging with leisure needs in further detail. We ﬁrst assume that the
social planner considers that leisure needs deserve compensation and characterize the optimal
redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging. It is worth noticing
that, even if leisure needs are observable, the amount required to fully compensate for needs
diﬀers across ability types, and depends on the unobservable ability of individuals. This is
in contrast with the linear consumption needs case studied by Boadway and Pestieau (2006),
where the amount of compensation for needs is independent of the ability type . This makes the
analysis considerably more complicated. We also consider situations in which the social planner
3may hold individuals responsible for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal solution in
this case. We show that, contrary to the consumption needs case, it is not possible to make all
needy individuals responsible for their needs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model
with two levels of ability and two levels of leisure needs, and provide the laissez-faire allocation.
In section 3 we characterize the ﬁrst-best solution, when both ability and leisure needs are
assumed to be observable. We characterize the second-best optimum, with unobservable ability
but observable leisure needs, in section 4. We do so for a relatively general social welfare
function. In order to shed more light on the results we explore several simpler speciﬁcations.
We concentrate ﬁrst on three-types societies, like Akerlof (1978), but take into account all the
possible diﬀerent combinations. We also provide the maximin results. It is worth noticing
that we consider a quasilinear utility speciﬁcation, similar to the one used by Boadway and
Pestieau (2006), but with the key diﬀerence that needs appear in the non-linear disutility of
labor term rather than the linear consumption term. In the absence of needs, however, the utility
speciﬁcation would be the same and their analysis of pure tagging does then carry over provided
we impose similar restrictions on the social utility. In section 5, we explore the consequences of
adopting an alternative social objective in which the planner attempts to make the individuals
responsible for their needs. We brieﬂy discuss in section 6 the implications of being unable to
observe leisure needs. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The model
We assume that individuals diﬀer in ability and leisure needs. We consider two types of ability
wi, with w2 > w1, where wi corresponds to the wage rate of a type-i individual, and two levels
of leisure needs, represented by ￿j, with ￿1 > ￿2. There is hence four types of individuals ij. We
assume that individual preferences can be represented by a quasilinear utility of the form:




i,j = 1,2 (1)
where cij and ￿ij represent the consumption and the labor supply of individual ij, and the
disutility of labor function v(.) is assumed to be continuous, diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly convex function (i.e. v￿ > 0 and v￿￿ > 0). In what follows we normalize the leisure
need of the low-need individuals ￿2 to 0 and denote the leisure need of the high-need individual
4by ￿. Accordingly, we refer to needy and non-needy individuals. The proportion of individuals







As pointed out by Boadway and Pestieau (2003a), the assumption that individual utilities
are identical net of needs implies that utility levels are comparable among households. This
avoids the conceptual problem of how to deﬁne the social planner’s objective function when
individual preferences are diﬀerent and utilities are non-comparable. For an analysis of optimal
redistribution with heterogeneous preferences, see Boadway et al. (2002). We represent in Figure
1 sets of individual indiﬀerence curves that yield the same utility level. We do so in Figure 1(a)
for two individuals with the same ability wi and diﬀerent needs in the (￿,c)-space. The two
indiﬀerence curves are horizontally parallel and the horizontal distance is given by the amount
of leisure need ￿. The indiﬀerence curves of individuals with diﬀerent ability and identical needs
have the same shape in this space. However, this is not longer the case in the (y,c)-space where
y = w￿. In Figure 1(b) we represent a set of indiﬀerence curves for the four types that yields the
same utility level to all. For each needs type, the indiﬀerence curve of a low-ability individual is
steeper than the indiﬀerence curve of a high-ability individual (that is, the usual single crossing
property applies within each needs group). The indiﬀerence curves of individuals with the same
ability but diﬀerent needs are horizontally parallel, and the horizontal distance is given by the
value of the leisure needs, wi￿, which is diﬀerent for diﬀerent ability levels. The four individuals’




-space where, as in
Boadway and Pestieau (2003a), ￿ ￿ij = ￿ij + ￿j denotes the eﬀective labor supply.
In a market economy, each individual chooses cij and ￿ij to maximize (1) subject to the
budget constraint cij = wi￿ij. Hence,
max
￿ij
















= w2 > v￿ ￿
￿1j + ￿j
￿
= w1 → ￿2j > ￿1j → y2j > y1j.
All individuals with the same ability provide the same eﬀective labor supply. However, the















Figure 1: Sets of indiﬀerence curves yielding the same level of utility
individuals. Hence, needy individuals earn a lower income. Among those individuals with the
same needs, we have the standard result that those with higher ability work and earn more.
High-ability non-needy individuals work and earn the most. Low-ability needy individuals work
and earn the least. It is not possible to disentangle a priori the relationship between high-
ability needy individuals and low-ability non-needy individuals (i.e. y21 and y12). The precise
relationship depends on the particular ability and need gaps, as well as the speciﬁc functional
form for the disutility of labor. In any case, within each ability group, needy individuals earn
less than non-needy ones. It seems in principle fair to compensate for diﬀerences in leisure
needs within ability groups, and for diﬀerences in ability overall. We represent the laissez-faire
allocation in Figure 2, both in the (￿,c)-space and the (y,c)-space.
3 The ﬁrst-best
As a benchmark we analyze the ﬁrst-best solution. The problem of the planner who fully observes














+ µ(wi￿ij − cij)
￿
,
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Given the quasi-
linearity of individual utilities, we use a strictly concave social utility transformation G(·) to






























Figure 2: Laissez-faire allocation
The FOCs yield:
G￿












ij is the marginal social utility of consumption accruing to individual ij. Hence,













i2 (￿i2) → ￿i1 + ￿ = ￿i2 → ￿i1 < ￿i2.
Among individuals with the same needs, the most productive work more. Individuals with the
same ability supply the same eﬀective amount of labour ￿ ￿. Again, those with higher needs
work less in the marketplace but in the ﬁrst-best all individuals achieve the same level of utility
regardless their ability or needs (i.e. ci1 = ci2). Hence,




is equal for all ij. How can this ﬁrst-best allocation be decentralized? In addition to the tradi-
tional redistribution between ability groups there is redistribution within each ability group from
non-needy to needy individuals. What makes compensation for leisure needs more complicated
is that, unlike the case of consumption needs, the compensation for leisure needs within ability
groups is diﬀerent and depends on the ability rate wi.
7Boadway and Pestieau (2003a) show that full compensation for consumption needs would
require a rather simple tax-transfer scheme. In order to fully compensate for needs in consump-
tion c, and achieve the same eﬀective consumption ￿ c = c − c for all the individuals with the
same ability, a lump-sum transfer of (n12 + n22)c needs to be provided to each needy individual
and a lump-sum tax of (n11 + n21)c raised from each non-needy individual, regardless of their
ability.
In our case, since the valuation of the leisure needs is diﬀerent for each ability type, a
transfer of equal magnitude to both ability types within the needy group would not lead to
full compensation. If we call Ti1 the net transfer to individual i1 (where i stands for the
two diﬀerent ability types within the needy group) and T2 the net transfer from non-needy
individuals, regardless of ability,1 we have that, in order to fully compensate for needs within
ability groups:
T11 = w1￿ + T2,
T21 = w2￿ + T2.
The sum of net transfers should fulﬁll the budget constraint n11T11+n21T21+(n12 + n22)T2 = 0.
The equilibrium set of transfers is:
T2 = −(n11w1 + n21w2)￿ < 0,
T11 = [(n12 + n22)w1 − n21 (w2 − w1)]￿, and
T21 = [(n12 + n22)w2 + n11 (w2 − w1)]￿ > 0.
Both types of non-needy individuals pay a lump-sum tax. High-ability needy individuals receive
a lump-sum transfer but low-ability non-needy individuals may pay a lump-sum tax or receive
a lump-sum transfer. For the latter to be the case (n12 + n22)w1 > n21 (w2 − w1), which might
be satisﬁed if the proportion of high-ability needy individuals and/or the productivity gap are
suﬃciently small. The ﬁrst-best allocation is depicted in Figure 3, both in the (￿,c)-space and
the (y,c)-space. In this last space the set of indiﬀerence curves represented - 11, 12, 21 and 22
- yield the same utility level.
1Note that a set of three diﬀerent net transfers {T11,T21,T2} is suﬃcient in this case because the valuation of
leisure needs for all non-needy individuals is the same (i.e. zero). In the more general case, with positive high and
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Figure 3: First-best allocation
4 Tagging with leisure needs
In a second-best framework with imperfect information we need to incorporate self-selection
constraints (hereafter SSCs) to induce individuals to reveal their true types. When needs are
observable, the relevant SSCs are the ones that relate individuals of diﬀerent ability in each
needs group (i.e. preventing 21 from mimicking 11 and 22 from mimicking 12). Note that in
Figure 3(b) a type 21 individual would be better oﬀ with the treatment designed for a type 11,
at indiﬀerence curve 21’. Similarly a type 22 individual would be better oﬀ with the treatment
designed for 12, at indiﬀerence curve 22’. Note also that the horizontal distance between the
indiﬀerence curves of the high-ability individuals in the ﬁrst-best allocation is w2￿, while the
horizontal distance between two high-ability individuals attempting to mimic the low-ability
individuals in their respective groups is w1￿, which would mean that in such an event a type-22
mimicker would be better oﬀ than a type-21 mimicker.





















nij (yij − cij) ≥ 0






















where λj stand for the Lagrange multipliers associated with SSCs within each needs group j
(with j = 1,2). The FOCs are:





− λ1 = 0 (2)





























− λ2 = 0 (4)



























+ λ1 = 0 (6)























+ λ2 = 0 (8)

















From (2), (4), (6) and (8) we obtain:
G￿
















The relationship between the utility level achieved by individuals of the same ability and
diﬀerent needs depends on the ratio of the value of the Lagrange multiplier (the strength of the
SSC in the group) to the proportion of individuals of that ability level in each group (the larger



















































The second-best levels of y22 and y21 coincide with the ﬁrst-best ones and both of these types of
individuals supply the same eﬀective amount of labor ￿ ￿. There is no eﬃciency gain in distorting
the labour supply choice of any of the high-ability individuals. This does not mean that both
types achieve the same utility because, as mentioned above, they might end up with diﬀerent
consumption. Both low-ability individuals are distorted at the margin and supply a lower
eﬀective labor than in the ﬁrst-best. However, the relationship between the amounts of eﬀective















At this level of generality it is diﬃcult to give more precise results. We cannot obtain
explicit expressions for the Lagrange multipliers in terms of the parameters, particularly the
distribution of types. In order to shed more light we explore several simpler speciﬁcations. We
concentrate ﬁrst on three-types societies. With 3 types one of the needs groups is composed
by individuals of the same ability, which becomes then public information. This is similar to
the kind of society considered originally by Akerlof (1978). We also explore the consequences
of adopting a particular social objective - the maximin - when all 4 types of individuals are
present. This particular social objective has been commonly employed in the literature on
tagging. For instance, Cremer et al. (2009) assume that the social planner is Rawlsian and
Boadway and Pestieau (2006) restrict the analysis to social objectives characterized by constant
absolute aversion to inequality, among which the maximin outcome is amply discussed.
4.1 Three-types societies
There are four diﬀerent possible three-types societies: {11,12,22}, {11,12,21}, {11,21,22} and
{12,21,22}. We formally analyze the ﬁrst case and brieﬂy mention the results for the other three.
When only individuals of types 11, 12 and 21 are present in the population, all needy
individuals are low-ability, and this information can be taken into account in the design of the
optimal tax system. There is now only one relevant self-selection constraint, the one that links
high- and low-ability types in the non-needy group and from (10) we know that U22 > U11 > U12


















A low-ability needy individual is made better oﬀ compared to a low-ability non-needy individual
because the social planner can identify her as being low-ability by observing her leisure needs.
This is consistent with Akerlof (1978)’s ﬁndings.
We can also study the marginal tax rates and the extent of compensation for leisure needs.
Type-22 individuals face a zero marginal tax rate and type-12 individuals face a positive mar-
ginal tax rate. This is consistent with the more general results shown above. When all needy
individuals are low-ability, and we apply separate tax schedules to needy and non-needy, there













The eﬀective labour supply of needy individuals is higher, but they are more than fully com-
pensated for their leisure needs through a larger consumption:












This situation is depicted in Figure 4. The lines 11, 12 and 22 represent the utility levels achieved
by these three types of individuals in the second-best allocation. The dashed lines 12’ and 22’
represent the indiﬀerence curves in situations where types 12 and 22 would obtain the same
utility level as type 11. Clearly type-12 individuals are worse oﬀ, and type-22 individuals better
oﬀ, than type-11 ones.
If all non-needy individuals are low-ability instead, which is the case when the society is
composed by types 11, 12, and 21, there is no beneﬁt in distorting the labor supply decision of
type-12 individuals. The eﬀective labor supply of type-11 individuals is low relative to type-12
(￿11 + ￿ < ￿12), but type-11 individuals also receive considerably less consumption, and end up
being worse than type-12 ones: U21 > U12 > U11.
In societies composed by two types, needy and non-needy, of high-ability individuals and
one type of low-ability individual, the relationship between the level of utility achieved by the
high-ability types depends on whether the low-ability type is needy or non-needy. We showed
in the general case that there is non-distortion at the margin on both high-ability types and
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Figure 4: Second-best allocation in the 11,12 and 22 society
of consumption depending on the group they belong to. If the low-ability type is needy, the
non-needy individuals are identiﬁed as high-ability types and U21 > U22 > U11. If the low-ability
type is non-needy, the needy individuals are identiﬁed as high-ability types and U22 > U21 > U12.
4.2 Maximin
We now explore the consequences of adopting a maximin social objective. As mentioned above,
this objective has been commonly assumed in the literature on tagging. In our case, the maximin















nij (yij − cij) ≥ 0

































where γ stands for the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that relates both
low-ability types. The public information on leisure needs implies that the two low-ability types
can be separated. There is then no incentive compatibility constraint linking the two-low ability
13types but instead a constraint that ensures that the utility of type-12 individuals does not fall
below the utility of type-11 ones. The FOCs associated with the consumption variables yield:
µ = 1, λ1 = n21, λ2 = n22 and γ = n12 + n22.
Therefore, all the constraints bind. It is worth noticing that U11 = U12 in the maximin outcome,
regardless of the distribution of abilities in the needy and non-needy groups. However, the
relationship between the eﬀective amount of labour they supply depends on the distribution of


























































In the extreme distributional cases where all high-ability individuals belong to the same
group, it is easy to show that ￿11 +￿ > ￿12 when high-ability individuals are non-needy, whereas
￿11 + ￿ < ￿12 when high-ability individuals are needy. In any case, the low-ability individual
who is pushed to work a relatively larger eﬀective amount of time (inclusive of her need) is
compensated by a higher consumption that equates both low-ability utility levels. The high-
ability individual achieves a higher level of utility.2
5 Responsibility
We have assumed so far that needy individuals deserve compensation for their needs, even if the
absence of full information on abilities implies imperfect compensation for leisure needs in most
cases.3 Compensation for leisure needs may seem fair when the need stems from some type of
disability or health condition that the individual has to account for before she can become an
active participant in the labor market. It is unclear, however, that the social planner would want
to compensate individuals for all possible types of leisure needs. In this section we consider the
consequences of deeming the individuals responsible for their needs.
2When all low-ability individuals belong to a single type (say, needy), those individuals belonging to the other
type (say, non-needy) can be identiﬁed as high-ability ones. If all non-needy individuals are high-ability ones,
there is no SSC in the non-needy group that sets a minimum bound on type 22’s utility. Hence, we must ensure
type-22’s utility does nof fall bellow type-11. This constraint binds and U21 > U22 = U11. If the low-ability type
is non-needy, the needy individuals are identiﬁed as high-ability types and U22 > U21 = U12.
3In the case of consumption needs analyzed by Boadway and Pestieau (2006), full compensation for needs
arises as long as the social planner is allowed to tag.
14We choose to capture responsibility for leisure needs in the social objective by rescaling type-
ij individual utility by a factor wi￿j. In other words we keep the disutility of labor as it is, with
the leisure need, but we compensate for this undue handicap by "taxing" the individual with its
market value. In Figure 6 we represent this cardinalization: a type-i1 individual works ￿i1 + ￿,
earns yi1 and consumes ci1, whereas a type-i2 individual works ￿i1 + ￿, earns yi2 = yi1 + wi￿
and consumes ci1+ wi￿ (i.e. the needy individual earns and consumes wi￿ less than the non-
needy one). The fact that two individuals with the same ability and diﬀerent needs achieve
diﬀerent allocations along the same budget constraint is not considered problematic when the
needy individual is deemed responsible for the shortfall.4 This is one possible representation of
the concept of responsibility. There are other ways although none is perfect. Fleurbaey (1995)
provides a rather broad discussion of the treatment of responsibility in economic theory and
in egalitarian theories of justice. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007) deal with this issue in
a framework more closely related to ours. They characterize the optimal income tax problem
when individuals diﬀer in ability and preferences for leisure, and consider fairness principles that
capture the notions of compensation and responsibility. In particular, Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2006) propose a fairness requirement that is based on the respect of individual preferences and
relates to Dworkin (1981) argument that, when all agents have the same wage rate and all have
access to the same labor-consumption bundles, there is no need for redistribution as any income
diﬀerence is then a matter of personal preferences. We apply a similar principle to needs rather
than preferences.


















+ µ(wi￿ij − cij)
￿
.
The FOCs yield G￿
ij = µ ∀ij, v￿ ￿
￿1j + ￿j
￿
= w1 and v￿ ￿
￿2j + ￿j
￿
= w2. The labor supply of
each type coincides with what was obtained before in the ﬁrst-best problem with compensation






















which implies ci2 − ci1 = wi￿ and, hence, no compensation for leisure needs.
4Note that under compensation for leisure needs the indiﬀerence curves i1 and i2
￿ represented the same utility
level for types i1 and i2, respectively, whereas under responsibility, it is now the indiﬀerence curves i1 and i2 that












Figure 5: Compensation versus responsibility for leisure needs
The second-best problem and the associated FOCs are similar in form to those obtained
with compensation. The only diﬀerence is that the argument of G￿ (.) in the FOCs includes
now the rescaling factor wi￿j. It is worth noticing that, although the social planner employs
it in the social objective, the rescaling factor does not appear in the SSCs. All high-ability
individuals face zero marginal tax rates. The eﬀective labor supply is the same for both high-
ability types (i.e. ￿21 + ￿ = ￿22) and coincides with the one obtained in the ﬁrst-best. In any
case the relationship between the utility levels, which now include the rescaling factor w2￿j, is
determined by comparing λ1/n21 and λ2/n22. Both low-ability individuals face positive marginal
tax rates, and the relationship between their utility levels depends on the relationship between
λ1/n11 and λ2/n12.
Boadway and Pestieau (2006) did not consider making individuals responsible for their con-
sumption needs. Nevertheless, it could similarly be argued that, even though it may seem fair
to compensate individuals for certain kinds of consumption needs (for instance, certain expenses
on health care), there may be other kinds of consumption needs that the individuals should
be deemed responsible for. It is worth recalling that, in their framework, consumption needs
appear in the linear term of the quasilinear utility speciﬁcation, and the magnitude of the need
is the same regardless of ability type. It is quite straightforward to show that, in such a setting,
tagging with responsibility for needs would yield the same results as pure tagging (i.e. tagging
when the observable characteristic has no welfare signiﬁcance).
In our case responsibility for leisure needs does not lead to the pure tagging outcome because
16a uniform rescaling down of the consumption of both needy individuals does not imply that both
ability types are made responsible for their needs to the same extent. This is best illustrated by













The needy low-ability individuals are made responsible for their leisure needs when their con-
sumption is shifted down by the amount w1￿. The allocation of high-ability individuals is shifted
down by the same amount due to the SSC that links both needy individuals. This means that
the needy high-ability individuals are not made fully responsible for their leisure needs, which
would require shifting down their consumption by w2￿.
6 Non-observable needs
We have assumed that needs are observable and can be used as a tag. We brieﬂy discuss here
the implications of being unable to observe leisure needs. With unobservable ability and leisure
needs, we have an optimal tax problem similar to the one studied by Cremer et al. (2001).5
They show that the distribution of the two characteristics, and in particular the correlation
between them, plays a crucial role. Their analysis also emphasizes the complexities involved in
determining the pattern of binding self-selection constraints.
In our case, a simple comparison of the marginal rates of substitution of consumption for











points to the impossibility of establishing in general whether the indiﬀerence curves of type-21
individuals are steeper or ﬂatter than those of type-12 ones. This has important implications for
the analysis of binding self-selection constraints in the general four-types society. However, in
the three-types societies where those two types do not coexist, it is possible to unambiguously
determine the direction in which the single-crossing property holds. For the 3-type society
{11,12,22}, we obtained a ranking of individual utility levels U22 > U11 > U12 when leisure needs
5Cremer et al. (2001) studies the optimal tax mix problem when individuals diﬀer in unobservable productivity
and endowments. They consider several consumption goods and a separable, but not necessarily quasi-linear,
utility speciﬁcation.
17were observable and used as a tag. When leisure needs are not observable, and can no longer be
used as a tag, type-11 individuals are clearly the worst-oﬀ and we have that U22 > U12 > U11.
The marginal tax rate on type-11 individuals is now positive due to an additional binding self-
selection constraint that precludes type-12 individuals from applying for the treatment designed
for type-11 individuals. For the 3-type society {11,21,22} we obtained U21 > U22 > U11 before
but if the tag is no longer available we have that U22 > U21 > U11.
It is worth emphasizing a key diﬀerence with respect to the consumption needs case studied by
Boadway and Pestieau (2006). If consumption needs were unobservable in their framework, two
individuals with the same ability but diﬀerent needs would become eﬀectively indistinguishable.
Their indiﬀerence curves in the (y,c)-space exhibit the same shape, even if the two types achieve
diﬀerent utility levels when allocated the same (y,c)-bundle, given that the eﬀective consumption
of the needy individual is then lower. In our framework, the indiﬀerence curves of two individuals
with the same ability and diﬀerent needs exhibit, according to (11), diﬀerent shapes. This feature
can be exploited to separate them in the case of unobservable leisure needs if it is shown optimal
to do so.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the optimal redistributive tax scheme when individuals diﬀer in
two characteristics, earning ability and leisure needs, which were assumed to be imperfectly
correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities, but needs are observable.
The population can then be separated into two groups and needs can be used as a tag. We ﬁrst
assumed that the social planner considered leisure needs as a characteristic relevant for compen-
sation and characterized the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for
leisure needs, with tagging. Even if leisure needs are observable, the amount required to fully
compensate the individuals for their needs diﬀers across ability types, and depends on their
unobservable ability. This implies imperfect compensation for needs in most cases. We have
also considered situations in which the social planner deemed individuals responsible for their
leisure needs and characterized the optimal solution in this case. We showed, using the maximin
illustration with four types, that attempting to make individuals responsible for their leisure
needs does not correspond to pure tagging, as it would be the case with linear consumption
needs. Even if needy low-ability individuals were made fully responsible for their needs, it is
18not possible to make needy high-ability individuals fully responsible. We also brieﬂy discussed
the implications of being unable to observe leisure needs, which is an issue that deserves further
research.
References
[1] Akerlof, G.A.(1978), The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax,
Welfare Programs, and Manpower Training, American Economic Review, 68, 8-19.
[2] Blomquist, S. and L. Micheletto (2008). Aget-related Optimal Income Taxation, Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics, 110, 45-71.
[3] Boadway, R. and P. Pestieau (2006), Optimal taxation with tagging, Annales d’Economie
et de Statistique, 83-84, 123-50.
[4] Boadway, R. and P. Pestieau (2003a), Optimal redistribution and needs, in Michael
Ahlheim, Heinz-dieter Wenzel and Wolfgang Weigard (eds.), Steuerpolitk-Von der Theo-
rie zur Praxis, Fetschrift fur Manfred Rose (Berlin Springer-Verlag), 1-14.
[5] Boadway, R. and P. Pestieau (2003b), Indirect Taxation and Redistribution: the Scope of
the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem in Imperfect Economics, Essays in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz,
R. Kanbur and R. Arnott (eds), MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 387-403.
[6] Boadway, R., M. Marchand, P. Pestieau and M. Racionero (2002), Optimal redistribution
with heterogeneous preference for leisure, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4, 475-498.
[7] Cremer, H., F. Gahvari, and J-M Lozachmeur (2009), Tagging and Income Taxation: The-
ory and Application, American Economic Journal - Economic Policy, forthcoming.
[8] Cremer, H., P. Pestieau and J-C. Rochet (2001), Direct versus indirect taxation. The design
of the tax structure revisited, International Economic Review, 42, 781-99.
[9] Dworkin, R. (1981), What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, Philosophy and
Public Aﬀairs, 10, 283-345.
[10] Fleurbaey, M. (1995), Equality and responsibility, European Economic Review, 39, 683-689.
19[11] Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet (2006), Fair income tax, Review of Economic Studies, 73,
55-83.
[12] Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet (2007), Help the low-skilled or let the hardworking thrive?
A study of fairness in optimal income taxation, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9,
467-500.
[13] Immonen, R., R. Kanbur, M. Keen and M. Tuomala (1988), Tagging and Taxing: The
Optimal Use of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes,
Economica, 65, 179-192.
[14] Lozachmeur, J-M. (2006), Optimal age-speciﬁc income taxation, Journal of Public Eco-
nomic Theory, 8, 697-711.
[15] Mirrlees, J. (1971), An exploration in the theory of optimal taxation, Review of Economics
Studies, 38, 175-208.
[16] Rowe, N. and F. Woolley (1999), The Eﬃciency Case for Universality, Canadian Journal
of Economics, 32, 613-629.
[17] Stiglitz, J.E. (1982), Self-Selection and Pareto Eﬃcient Taxation, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics , 17, 213-240.
20Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2009/85.  Erwin OOGHE and Erik SCHOKKAERT. School accountability: (how) can we reward schools 
and avoid cream-skimming. 
2009/86.  Ilke VAN BEVEREN and Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE. Product and process innovation and the 
decision to export: firm-level evidence for Belgium. 
2010/1.  Giorgia  OGGIONI  and  Yves  SMEERS.  Degree  of  coordination  in  market-coupling  and 
counter-trading. 
2010/2.  Yu.  NESTEROV.  Efficiency  of  coordinate  descent  methods  on  huge-scale  optimization 
problems. 
2010/3.  Geert DHAENE an Koen JOCHMANS. Split-panel jackknife estimation of fixed-effect models. 
2010/4.  Parkash CHANDER. Cores of games with positive externalities. 
2010/5.  Gauthier  DE  MAERE  D'AERTRYCKE  and  Yves  SMEERS.  Liquidity  risks  on  power 
exchanges. 
2010/6.  Marc  FLEURBAEY,  Stéphane  LUCHINI,  Christophe  MULLER  and  Erik  SCHOKKAERT. 
Equivalent income and the economic evaluation of health care. 
2010/7.  Elena IÑARRA, Conchi LARREA and Elena MOLIS. The stability of the roommate problem 
revisited. 
2010/8.  Philippe  CHEVALIER,  Isabelle  THOMAS  and  David  GERAETS,  Els  GOETGHEBEUR, 
Olivier JANSSENS, Dominique PEETERS and Frank PLASTRIA. Locating fire-stations: an 
integrated approach for Belgium. 
2010/9.  Jean-Charles LANGE and Pierre SEMAL. Design of a network of reusable logistic containers. 
2010/10.  Hiroshi UNO. Nested potentials and robust equilibria. 
2010/11.  Elena MOLIS and Róbert F. VESZTEG. Experimental results on the roommate problem. 
2010/12.  Koen DECANCQ. Copula-based orderings of multivariate dependence. 
2010/13.  Tom TRUYTS. Signaling and indirect taxation. 
2010/14.  Asel ISAKOVA. Currency substitution in the economies of Central Asia: How much does it 
cost? 
2010/15.  Emanuele FORLANI. Irish firms' productivity and imported inputs. 
2010/16.  Thierry BRECHET, Carmen CAMACHO and Vladimir M. VELIOV. Model predictive control, 
the economy, and the issue of global warming. 
2010/17.  Thierry BRECHET, Tsvetomir TSACHEV and Vladimir M. VELIOV. Markets for emission 
permits with free endowment: a vintage capital analysis. 
2010/18.  Pierre M. PICARD and Patrice PIERETTI. Bank secrecy, illicit money and offshore financial 
centers. 
2010/19.  Tanguy ISAAC. When frictions favour information revelation. 
2010/20.  Jeroen V.K. ROMBOUTS and Lars STENTOFT. Multivariate option pricing with time varying 
volatility and correlations. 
2010/21.  Yassine  LEFOUILI  and  Catherine  ROUX.  Leniency  programs  for  multimarket  firms:  The 
effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation. 
2010/22.  P.  Jean-Jacques  HERINGS,  Ana  MAULEON  and  Vincent  VANNETELBOSCH.  Coalition 
formation among farsighted agents. 
2010/23.  Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIERE. Long term care insurance puzzle. 
2010/24.  Elena DEL REY and Miguel Angel LOPEZ-GARCIA. On welfare criteria and optimality in an 
endogenous growth model. 
2010/25.  Sébastien  LAURENT,  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS  and  Francesco  VIOLANTE.  On  the 
forecasting accuracy of multivariate GARCH models. 
2010/26.  Pierre DEHEZ. Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods. 
2010/27.  Olivier  DURAND-LASSERVE,  Axel  PIERRU  and  Yves  SMEERS.  Uncertain  long-run 
emissions targets, CO2 price and global energy transition: a general equilibrium approach. 
2010/28.  Andreas  EHRENMANN  and  Yves  SMEERS.  Stochastic  equilibrium  models  for  generation 
capacity expansion. 
 Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2010/29.  Olivier DEVOLDER, François GLINEUR and Yu. NESTEROV. Solving infinite-dimensional 
optimization problems by polynomial approximation. 
2010/30.  Helmuth CREMER and Pierre PESTIEAU. The economics of wealth transfer tax. 
2010/31.  Thierry  BRECHET  and  Sylvette  LY.  Technological  greening,  eco-efficiency,  and  no-regret 
strategy. 
2010/32.  Axel  GAUTIER  and  Dimitri  PAOLINI.  Universal  service  financing  in  competitive  postal 
markets: one size does not fit all. 
2010/33.  Daria ONORI. Competition and growth: reinterpreting their relationship. 
2010/34.  Olivier DEVOLDER, François GLINEUR and Yu. NESTEROV. Double smoothing technique 
for infinite-dimensional optimization problems with applications to optimal control. 
2010/35.  Jean-Jacques DETHIER, Pierre PESTIEAU and Rabia ALI. The impact of a minimum pension 
on old age poverty and its budgetary cost. Evidence from Latin America. 
2010/36.  Stéphane ZUBER. Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounting utilitarian approach. 
2010/37.  Marc FLEURBAEY, Thibault GAJDOS and Stéphane ZUBER. Social rationality, separability, 
and equity under uncertainty. 
2010/38.  Helmuth CREMER and Pierre PESTIEAU. Myopia, redistribution and pensions. 
2010/39.  Giacomo  SBRANA  and  Andrea  SILVESTRINI.  Aggregation  of  exponential  smoothing 
processes with an application to portfolio risk evaluation. 
2010/40.  Jean-François CARPANTIER. Commodities inventory effect. 




J. GABSZEWICZ (ed.) (2006), La différenciation des produits. Paris, La découverte. 
L. BAUWENS, W. POHLMEIER and D. VEREDAS (eds.) (2008), High frequency financial econometrics: 
recent developments. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag. 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P.  COMBES,  Th.  MAYER  and  J-F.  THISSE  (eds.)  (2008),  Economic  geography:  the  integration  of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
J-M. HURIOT and J-F. THISSE (eds) (2009), Economics of cities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
P. BELLEFLAMME and M. PEITZ (eds) (2010), Industrial organization: markets and strategies. Cambridge 
University Press. 
M. JUNGER, Th. LIEBLING, D. NADDEF, G. NEMHAUSER, W. PULLEYBLANK, G. REINELT, G. 
RINALDI and L. WOLSEY (eds) (2010), 50 years of integer programming, 1958-2008: from 
the early years to the state-of-the-art. Berlin Springer. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
C. GOURIÉROUX and A. MONFORT (1995), Simulation Based Econometric Methods. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1996), Lectures on Modeling Bounded Rationality. 
J. RENEGAR (1999), A Mathematical View of Interior-Point Methods in Convex Optimization. 
B.D.  BERNHEIM  and  M.D.  WHINSTON  (1999),  Anticompetitive  Exclusion  and  Foreclosure  Through 
Vertical Agreements. 
D.  BIENSTOCK  (2001),  Potential  function  methods  for  approximately  solving  linear  programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 